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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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SUPPLEMENT TO
REPORT NO.

1. Soviet intervention in the internal political and economic life, the security apparatus, and the army of the Czechoslovak Republic has its legal basis in the broad formulation of Soviet-Czechoslovak alliance, mutual aid and cooperation contained in the treaty of 1943, which was signed in Moscow by Dr. Eduard Benes. Supplementary agreements and treaties have been concluded since 1945 and appended to this treaty, so that today Czechoslovakia is under the direct control of the Soviet Union.
2. Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia is directed at four main sectors: organization and control of the security apparatus; control and co-management of the main branches of industry; control and participation in the nation's internal and foreign policies accomplished to a considerable extent through the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia; control and co-management of the army, which has been adapted to Soviet specifications. Soviet intervention in the army and industry is legalized by supplementary agreements to the 1945 treaty, and the presence and activities of Soviet technicians in individual sectors of industry are expressed as a form of aid which the Czechoslovak government requested of the Soviet Union. These legal formalities are maintained even in extremes, and in cases where the facts are not kept in strict secrecy, they are used for propaganda purposes to demonstrate the necessity of following the great example of the USSR, as well as to point out the unselfishness of the aid of the USSR.
3. Absolute secrecy is maintained on the subject of Soviet control of the Czech security apparatus. There is no written agreement covering it; only oral agreements have been made between the leaders of the two countries. Not even the Czech government is informed of the presence of Soviet security agents in Prague or of their indirect co-management and organization of the Czechoslovak security apparatus. The group of Soviet security agents works

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entirely independent of Czech governmental agencies, a fact which is not true of the other sectors. Its headquarters are in the villa quarter of Bubeneč and contact with the Ministry of National Security (MNS) is maintained directly through Minister Ladislav Kopriva, his cabinet, and his personal Russian secretary, McCaskova, who is the wife of McCask, the Director of the Cultural Section of the Office of the President of the Republic. McCaskova is originally from Moscow, where she was a functionary of the Komsomol. Her presence makes liaison easier for Kopriva, since all correspondence is conducted in Russian and all working programs, orders, and directives are translated into and from Russian. She is also able to maintain direct control of events through Kopriva. Contacts are also maintained through several specially selected members of the SNB (Sbor Narodni Bezpecnosti - National Security Corps) who have been approved by the Russians. One of these is Gernadij Veteřel (sic).

4. Soviet agents visit the Ministry of National Security only rarely, and on the pretext of other business. These visits are made only for important conferences with the leaders of the Ministry of National Security, and even in this case with leaders of only one section of the Ministry. No direct contact exists between the chiefs of the individual sections of the Ministry of National Security and the Soviet agents, or with the Soviet security mission in Prague. They are informed of the decisions of the Soviet mission through a single section, and all the work of the Ministry is adapted to this purpose. The individual sections of the Ministry of National Security do not work on their own authority, and that of the section chiefs is strictly limited. The individual sections of the Ministry cannot take any important steps without previously informing the Minister.
5. The main interest of the Soviet security mission is in the organization of the internal security service - the SNB and StB (Statni Bezpecnost - State Security). Soviet methods are being introduced into the organization and training of both these units. The entire security apparatus is directed centrally from the MNS, which is also the headquarters of the SNB. Until recently the supreme commander of the SNB was at the same time the Deputy Minister of National Security; both positions were held by SNB General Josef Pavel until his arrest in January 1951. Now the Supreme Commander of the SNB is SNB Colonel Leopold Hofmann, who was formerly the leader of President Gottwald's bodyguard. Because of his relationship with Gottwald, Hofmann is one of the few volunteers with the Czech forces in the Spanish Civil War who survived the latest purge.
6. The SNB and the StB are organized according to the Soviet system on the county (kraj), district (okres), and regional (obvod) levels. The MNS and the supreme command of the SNB and StB also have direct contact with individual units at a lower level. In addition to this vertical structure there is a horizontal control through the National Committees and their security referents, also on the county, district, and regional levels. Recently, according to the Soviet example, permanent district security services were installed and made responsible for constant control over a small area of a few houses in the cities. The security agents are informed on all the inhabitants of their region and steadily supplied with information by their so-called "home confidants", who are organized officially from among the local Communist Party members. At the same time there is another, unofficial group of informers who are unknown either to the inhabitants or to the members of the Communist Party; most of them are not even members of the Party. The "okresek" referent of the MNS and StB is in all cases a member of the Communist Party and his reliability is specially checked on. He is entitled to have direct contact with higher security organs without having to go through channels or report to his immediate superior. This system of operative units in the security apparatus has resulted in the complete organizational adaptation of the Czechoslovak security system to that of the Soviet militia and the MVD.

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7. The Soviet mission also has an interest in the organization and training of the factory workers' militias. These are theoretically subordinate to the factory councils and factory committees of the Communist Party, but in fact they are direct components of the state security apparatus and are centrally directed by the MNB and by the SNB command. The factory security referents are direct liaison agents, recruited either from among MNB and SNB employees, or from workers who have been given special political and technical training by the Ministry of National Security and practical training by the SNB. So far the factory militia has not satisfied the requirements of the security leaders, nor has it conformed to the Soviet form and function of factory militias. For this reason a new reorganization is in progress, particularly as concerns the selection of militia members on the basis of political reliability ("cadre selection"). It is intended that each member of the factory militia should be placed on the same level as an SNB member in regards to political reliability, training, and practice. The result will be that these two organizations will combine in all but formal distinction. The position of security referent in an industrial plant will correspond to that of regional (obvod) commander of the SNB. The factory militias have already been structurally reorganized and joined to the central security apparatus. The members of the factory militias have sworn the same oaths as SNB members and they train with units of the SNB. Where the reorganization has been completed factory militias are beginning to be used for internal security tasks. The members of the factory militias have the position of so-called security agents and are the security referent's main informers. In addition, however, the security referent has his own network of informers, who are not Party members. Even outside the factory a militia member has the right to carry arms, and in case of need to take public security measures with the same rights as a member of the SNB.
8. Among the special secret sections of the Ministry of National Security, the attention of the Soviet mission is concentrated on the defensive sections. Here the methods of the Soviet secret service have also been introduced and the work of the Czechoslovak secret security agencies is directly connected with the Soviet services. This is manifest in the fact that a number of the tasks of the secret defensive service are carried out more in the interest of the MVD than in that of Czechoslovakia. A similar situation exists in the activities of the offensive section, whose activities are adapted primarily to the interests of Soviet espionage, and which works for this service on a number of individual tasks. The director of the intelligence section was formerly Deputy Minister Karel Svab, the brother of Marie Svernova. Before he transferred to the Ministry of National Security he was director of the security section of the central secretariat of the Communist Party, which has political supervision over the entire Ministry of National Security. At present this security section is directed by Heda Synkova, the widow of the prewar Communist leader Deputy Synck. After Svab was arrested no new director was named to the intelligence section to the time Source left the country. The job was temporarily given to Mun, who was the cadre deputy of the Ministry of National Security.
9. Until his arrest in January 1951, the director of the defensive intelligence section was Osvald Zavodsky, who had previously worked in the security section of the central secretariat of the KSC (Communist Party) under Svab. Zavodsky was responsible for the entire apparatus of the defensive section with the exception of the Frontier Guard. In the latter organization he also had the right to share decisions. More recently the Frontier Guard has been completely reorganized to coincide with the Soviet pattern. Osvald Zavodsky did not show much fervor or readiness to follow Soviet orders, and his attitude concerning cooperation with the Soviet security mission was not without reservations. In this matter he had differences with some of his own employees and liaison agents with the Soviet mission, including a conflict with Gennadij Vetengl, who was liaison agent of the defensive section of the MNB. Vetengl, who resigned from the MNB as a result of this difficulty, considered Zavodsky an anti-Soviet element and played a considerable part in the case against Zavodsky after his arrest. Vetengl was then rehired by the Ministry of National Security.

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10. Another person with whom Zavodsky had difficulties was Jarin Hoscck, a captain in the security service, who is also said to have left the Ministry of National Security because of differences with Zavodsky and who worked for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs until Zavodsky was arrested, when he was rehired by the MNB. It was said of Zavodsky that he was anti-Soviet, and that he was trying to drive all pro-Soviet personnel out of the MNB to make impossible cooperation with the Soviet mission. The Soviet mission, through Vetengl and Hoscck, played the main role in getting rid of Zavodsky. Along with Zavodsky, Major Smolka, the director of the counterespionage section of the Ministry of National Security, his deputy, Captain Kroupa, and others were removed for more or less the same reasons.* They were further accused of espionage for a foreign power. Smolka was replaced by the referent of the section, a Captain Pixa, who belonged to the so-called pro-Soviet group, and who was promoted to Major. His deputy was another member of the same section and of the pro-Soviet group, Captain Sulc. In this manner this part of the defensive intelligence section was placed firmly under the influence of the Soviet mission, and was occupied by men who, if they were less qualified, were at least more pliable than those they replaced.
11. Similar changes were made in the passport and visa section of the Ministry of National Security, which was also under Zavodsky's defensive section. Here the interests of the Soviet mission were particularly great, especially as concerns the visa program. The right to issue visas is today exclusively under the Ministry of National Security, as is the right to issue passports and exit permits. A basic change has been made here since the arrests of Arthur London of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Bedrich Reicin of the Ministry of National Defense. These men had the right until that time to decide, within the limits of their offices, on the issuance of passports (London issued diplomatic passports) and exit visas (London had the special right to issue his own exit permits), as well as to decide on the question of issuing entrance visas. Now the Ministry of National Security has taken over these prerogatives, including those of the Ministry of National Defense and the diplomatic passports of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The director of the passport and visa section of the Ministry of National Security, Dr. Jaroslav Broz, has been arrested. He was replaced by the former referent of that section. All the former exceptions to the right to issue entrance visas have been abolished from the visa program of this section. The only exception which remains is that of visas for the International Communist Party, that is, for ambassadors from the Cominform countries, and this privilege has been sharply curtailed. The Ministry of National Security alone decides all other cases. In this matter the cooperation with the Soviet mission has been broadened so that this mission is now precisely informed about all visits of Czechs to other countries, as well as about all foreigners coming to Czechoslovakia. Only the director of the security section of the central secretariat of the Communist Party may ask for an entrance visa without giving a reason; even the requests of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for visas must be presented in this manner. This has so far been done by direct contact between the Communist Party and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The measure was taken on the request of the Soviet mission, so that even Party visas would be on the records of the mission.
12. Between the defensive and offensive sectors of the Ministry of National Security there is a section for so-called Trotskyist activities. This section is directed by Captain Tomek and cooperates with both offensive and defensive sections of the Ministry, which are supposed to give it all information concerning this question even remotely, as well as to help it according to its instructions. It is also to cooperate with the secretariat of the Party and with the Soviet mission. Since 1949 the activity of this section has been expanded to include so-called Titoism. The section is also in direct contact with other parts of the state apparatus, such as with the Yugoslav Section and the Press and Information Sections of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in order to follow Titoist activities abroad.

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13. Until he was arrested in January 1951 Oskar Vales was the director of the offensive sector of the Ministry of National Security; his deputy was Jiri Sindelar. So far no new director or deputy has been named to this sector. Vales was arrested for the same reason as was Zavodsky - it was said that they comprised together an anti-Soviet faction in the Ministry. The direct interest of the Soviet mission is perhaps least in this sector. The sector must, however, place all the information it receives at the disposal of the Soviet mission. The mission limits itself here to issuing certain directives which concern Soviet offensive intelligence on individual questions. The work of the offensive sector of the MNB is very closely connected to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to that Ministry's network of representatives in other countries, to its courier services, to the radio communications of that Ministry with its representations, and so forth. The MNB pays half of the cost of the courier services, and where two couriers are used one is usually an employee of the MNB. In a certain portion of the foreign program the activities of the offensive sector of the Ministry are coordinated with the interests of the defensive sector.
14. The last sector in which the Soviet mission is particularly interested is the Frontier Guard. By law this guard was placed on the same level as the army, but under the Ministry of National Security. The organization of the Frontier Guard has been adapted entirely to the Soviet system and special exercises are being held now for this purpose. In the training camps of the Frontier Guard, as in the camps of the SMN, training is held with the direct participation and cooperation of Soviet instructors. This is perhaps the only place where there is direct contact with the Soviets on a broad scale. The authority of the Soviet security mission extends even to the so-called work camps of the Ministry of National Security, but this authority is limited to questions of supplementing the labor force in industrial branches which are of interest to the Soviet Union.
15. The Soviet security mission in Czechoslovakia is the only one of all the Soviet missions which is not responsible to anyone in Czechoslovakia, not even the Soviet Embassy, but is directly under the MVD in Moscow. Its director is fully responsible for its activities. The number of members of the mission cannot be determined from the extent of its activities, but it is probably considerable, with a minimum of 30 persons. The mission is the guest of the Ministry of National Security; members wear civilian clothes and use Ministry cars with ordinary civilian licence numbers. Some members participated in the ceremonial reception at the end of the conference of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Cominform countries held in Prague in November 1950. One of these was Kukarkin, who cooperated (sic) on security measures during the conference, and the other was Topolev, who worked in Vales's sector. Members of the mission made another appearance at the reception on 7 November 1950 at the Soviet Embassy. At the conference of the Foreign Ministers all Czech security organs were subordinated to the Soviet security mission. For this conference, which was attended by Molotov, the Soviet security mission was expanded by a special security service which flew to Prague two days before the conference. A section of the StB, which was assigned to security service at the conference and was directed by StB Captain Vala, received a gift of 200 bottles of vodka from the Soviet Delegation in recognition of its cooperation. After the conference was over, and before the Soviet delegation flew home, Kukarkin personally thanked Kopriva and Pavel at the Ruzyně airport for the organization of the security service and their cooperation.
16. The Soviet mission has worked in Prague since the time when the security organs were under the Ministry of the Interior. At that time much was done by the security section of the central secretariat of the Party, which had considerable authority in the Ministry of the Interior. One of the main tasks of the Soviet mission was the separation of the security service and security apparatus from the Ministry of the Interior and the formation of the Ministry of National Security. This was done on the direct impetus of the Soviet mission.

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17. A large number of special missions of Soviet technicians are working in practically all the branches of basic industry in Czechoslovakia. A legal basis for this so-called cooperation, which is actually the direct management of Czechoslovak industrial production by the Soviet Union, is supplied in the majority of cases by the supplementary agreements to the treaty of 1943. The leading organ of all these missions is the Soviet commercial and economic mission at the Soviet Embassy in Prague. This is very fully manned, and is an official part of the Soviet representation in Czechoslovakia. The mission has a branch office for Slovakia at the Soviet Consulate General in Bratislava, which is controlled by the director of the commercial and economic mission in Prague. All reports filed by the Soviet industrial missions are sent through the Prague directorate. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been told several times by spokesmen for the Soviet Embassy of specific complaints of the members of these special missions concerning their work in various factories, and has been asked to take measures to answer these complaints.
18. In the majority of cases the Soviets maintain formalities as well as following conventional diplomatic procedures. The supplementary agreements and negotiations are signed with all formality and protocol - even in the case of secret agreements - by the proper offices of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs in Prague and Moscow. Such agreements include negotiations on the establishment of special sections in specific industrial plants, such as the Skoda works in Pilsen, Zbrojovka-Brno, and CKD, where Soviet technicians work under conditions similar to those of Czechoslovak workers.
19. The term "special sections" in industrial plants means those sections working on military production. The term is at present used even in official communications. These sections do not control all military production, but only production departments for special parts or assembly departments and experimental and research work. Workers and technicians for these sections are selected by the political reliability sections of the factories, and if destined for more important positions are approved by higher authorities, such as the political reliability sections of the various ministries and the county or central political reliability commission of the Communist Party. The apparent leading positions in these special sections are always filled with Czechs, rather than Russians, who are without formal title or rank; however, the Russians' authority in the factories is practically unlimited. In fact they administer not only all the special sections, but the entire plant. The Russian technicians divide and allocate the work in such a way that it is impossible to determine what quantities are being produced in these sections.
20. According to a decree of the presidium (sic) of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, which was issued to the factories of the various ministries, Soviet specialists have the right to demand that all working plans and plans of prototypes, all calculations, and all production details be put completely at their disposal. According to official propaganda, Czechoslovak factories are now working with the aid and advice of the Soviet technicians, and according to Soviet methods and plans. The fact is, however, that in the majority of cases Czechoslovak technicians improve on Soviet plans, and sometimes even rework them completely. It is said officially that the factories have been reoriented to the Soviet working methods; in fact the products go to the USSR. This has roused the resistance of Czechoslovak technicians, and conflicts have arisen in several instances with the Soviet missions. The best known of these were the ones in Brno and Pilsen, where production plans and calculations were refused to the Soviet mission. The Soviet Embassy intervened at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and immediately the central secretariat of the Czech Communist Party acted to rectify the situation. In the Brno case there resulted a conflict with the county secretariat of the Party, Ota Sling, which added to Sling's difficulties. The same thing happened to Lonsky, the county Party secretary in Pilsen.

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21. The central management of the Soviet industrial missions in Prague receives reports from the individual industrial sectors and in this manner centrally controls the fulfillment of production plans. In this way the Soviet missions co-manage the preparation of changes in production plans, and intervene to increase production or productivity. The missions have more authority in this than the individual responsible Czechoslovak industrial offices since the missions are told in their reports of a number of shortcomings and organizational errors of which the Czechoslovak offices have no inkling. The result is that the central management of the Soviet missions also becomes the managing agency for these Czechoslovak offices. There is no control here of the suggestions for improvement made by the Soviet missions, but they must be taken into consideration in all cases. This makes it possible to drive production to a maximum. At present there are known to be permanent missions of Soviet technicians in the following factories among others: CKD-Sokolovo; CKD-Stalingrad; Avia-Letnany; CKD-Slany; Stalin Works in Most; Ringhofer-Tatra; Skoda-Pilsen-Doudlevice; Tatra-Koprivnice; Zbrojovka-Brno; Zbrojovka-Strakonice; Explosia-Semtin; Ostrava-Vitkovice, Trinec, and Dvur Kralove Ironworks, and the Bratislava explosives plant. The technical missions contain varying numbers of persons, according to the size of the factory and the size of the special sections. The largest missions are in Prague, Kladno, Pilsen, and Brno. The expenses of the missions are paid by the management of the particular factory to which they are attached.
22. The main task of the industrial missions is the control and maximization of industrial production in the interests of the USSR. The result is a new super-governmental organ whose interests are greater than Czechoslovak, and which is a direct executive agent of planned and organized Soviet world rule. This measure is necessary from the Soviet viewpoint because the new measures and new demands surpass the comprehension of the Czechs who cannot, with the exception of certain Communist Party officials, be informed in detail of the real purposes of the various measures. The only path left open to the Soviets is direct intervention, leadership, and control in conformity with this plan and program. The present enormous increase in production of the heavy industry and war plants in Czechoslovakia is determined by overall Soviet strategy, and the task of the missions is to overcome all difficulties and to make the principal plan a success at any price.
23. In order to make the purpose of the Soviet missions entirely clear it is necessary to present the situation and the development of the Czechoslovak economy in detail. After February 1948 there was a definite, fundamental change in the orientation of the Czechoslovak economy. A slow, planned transition toward cooperation with the East began. In this early plan, however, the principal emphasis was placed on the interests of Czechoslovakia. In Czechoslovakia there was no longer the same concern for preserving existing economic relationships as there had been during the First Republic, when Czechoslovakia merely processed imported raw materials and reexported the finished products. According to the overall plan on which the economy was reoriented, Czechoslovak industry was to produce primarily from raw materials imported from the East, to expand and increase production of basic investment goods primarily in order to expand Czechoslovak industry itself, and at the same time make possible exports of heavy machinery to the USSR and the People's Democracies. This in turn was to lead to the steady elimination of all less essential production. Exports to the West were to be progressively limited to the minimum level necessary to cover imports of required raw materials and to assure a reserve of foreign exchange.

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24. During this period, industrial construction and production in Czechoslovakia developed very well. Thus, Czechoslovakia became in 1949 and 1950 the best supplied country in the entire Soviet sphere, and the living standard of her people increased. During 1951 the pressure from the USSR began to become evident. Not the least of the reasons for this increased pressure was the high living standard, which had begun to evoke criticism from the rest of the Soviet sphere, where the living standard is far from good, and even from the USSR. The development of industry in Czechoslovakia made it possible for the USSR to demand that Czechoslovakia increase its production of arms for Soviet interests. The increase in the arms industry plan in turn meant that a complete change was necessary in production programs and that the entire construction plan had to be abandoned. This forced change in plans, which required a reduction in the living standard, could not be comprehended by a large number of economic leaders who did not know the background of the measures as did the leadership of the Communist Party. Thus arose the first disagreements among Czech economists over the advisability of these proceedings with respect to the economic interests of Czechoslovakia.
25. Further facts appeared testifying to the shortcomings of the new plan. These included the poor quality of raw materials supplied by the Soviet Union, the low prices which the USSR paid for finished products in relation to the prices of raw materials, and the increase in Soviet trade with other countries using Czechoslovak goods and replacing direct Czechoslovak sales. In the economy, shaken by sudden changes, chaos was created. Economic specialists, even those in high places, began to disagree with the plan. For this reason the Party undertook a purge of so-called nationalist elements and of certain groups of economic specialists. As early as 1949 there were disagreements with Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, Evzen Lobl, with whom the Soviets finally refused to deal at all; shortly thereafter he was arrested. Then there were successive changes in the economic leadership of the country, until in the spring of 1951 the directors of five monopoly companies were replaced, including Fabinger, chief of the heavy machinery section of the Ministry of Industry, Jan Kratky, Manager of Kovo, Eng. Sirucka of Investa, and the directors of Papleo and Chemapol.
26. The drop in the living standard in Czechoslovakia did not become apparent immediately, but it began to be felt in the autumn of 1950, and increasingly in the spring of 1951. The sharp decline which has recently occurred is the result of a large number of closely related circumstances, primarily the nonfulfillment of obligations agreed upon in the Council of Economic Mutual Aid. This may be explained, however, by the impossibility of fulfilling these obligations because of the overload which the industries of all the countries of the Soviet sphere have experienced as a result of the tasks set by the new Soviet arms plan. Neither was the Soviet promise concerning deliveries of necessary raw materials to Czechoslovakia fulfilled. The USSR also agreed, within the framework of the Council of Economic Mutual Aid, to take care of the problem of acquiring foreign exchange for the satellites so that these countries would not have to worry about acquiring exchange by exporting goods to the West. Within the framework of the CEMA a gold pool was established for the purchase of strategic raw materials. This was to be particularly important for Czechoslovakia, which had restricted its trade with the West, under Soviet pressure, to a minimum. Without considering that this gold pool represents money owed to Czechoslovakia for goods delivered, the USSR continues to use the gold as its own, and each of the countries belonging to the system must ask the USSR for release of foreign exchange. Because of the complicated nature of the present situation, and because of the nature of trade with strategic raw materials and the inflexibility of the gold reserve, deliveries of raw materials, which should be steady in order not to interrupt production and the national economy, are instead very

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irregular. Recently it has appeared that the USSR is using the gold exclusively to meet its own purchase requirements and is making it practically impossible for any satellite state to buy strategic raw materials. Because of this Czechoslovakia has now been forced to dig into its own gold reserves in order that production not be interrupted.

27. In the spring of 1951 there was another increase in pressure from the Soviet Union on the Czechoslovak economy. The USSR, after considering the entire international situation, came to the conclusion that war would not come for two years or more, and therefore decided on a new strategic plan by which the Czechoslovak economic war potential would be further increased. This decision is the main reason for the present measures to recruit huge numbers of workers into production. The recruitment program must be met even at the cost of upsetting the rest of the national life. The problem of handling such an enormous influx of unskilled workers, 77,500 according to government announcements, who have been recruited against their will, has temporarily reduced productivity per capita and the quality of output, and has led to a further reduction in the living standard. All of this is causing understandably increased unrest among the large groups of people who are beginning to be affected by these measures. It is natural that this does not increase the love and admiration for the USSR among the people, in spite of the great efforts being made in this direction every day by official propaganda.
28. The elaboration of overall plans is not the task of the Soviet economic missions. The plans are worked out by Czechoslovak specialists and politicians together with leading Soviet officials, usually first in Moscow, and later in Prague. For this purpose special missions of leading economic officials come to Prague for short visits. The detailed working out of the overall plan is then left to individual groups in Prague and carried out by mixed commissions, including representatives of the USSR, of the various specialized offices (sic) and of the Czech Ministry of Planning. The leading individual in Czechoslovakia in these matters is Minister of Planning Jaromir Dolansky, a member of the presidium of the Communist Party, who spent almost two months in Moscow in 1950 preparing the 1951 plan. Part of this time was spent together with the Minister of Foreign Trade Antonin Gregor. The permanent representative of Czechoslovakia for common planning in the Council of Economic Mutual Aid is Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Office Dr. Goldman and Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Dr. Dvorak. Dvorak is also a liaison agent between the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Soviet mission in Prague. Liaison in the Planning Ministry is conducted personally by Goldman or Dolansky. In these matters the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is only an intermediary. Dr. Ludwig Frejka is cleared from the President's office for this collaboration; Rudolf Slansky and his deputy Josef Frank represent the presidium of the Communist Party.** The principal Soviet personality on the Council of Economic Mutual Aid is V.M. Molotov.

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29. There are no special Soviet missions or direct, permanent advisers in Czechoslovakia for the purpose of political intervention. The Soviet Union has its own people directly in the party apparatus of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and in leading political personalities, whose attitude and position it determines. These include Bedrich Geminder, Gustav Bares, Rudolf Slansky, Jaromir Kopecky, Vilem Siroky, Stefan Bastovansky, and Bruno Kähler. The one person in Czechoslovakia who has direct responsibility for political development in that country is Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Valerian A. Zorin. Zorin visits Czechoslovakia several times a year, officially and unofficially. In addition, leading Czech political personalities travel to Moscow for conferences and discussions. Other Soviet politicians for Czechoslovak questions are the Secretary of the VKP(b) Mikhail A. Suslov and the permanent Soviet representative in the Cominform, P.A. Yudin.*** Since the death of George Dimitrov, Yudin has also been the official theoretician of people's democracy. In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow there is an independent Czechoslovak section headed by Grechkin (sic) who used to accompany Zorin on his trips to Prague.
30. Current intervention measures, always handled very tactfully and according to protocol, are transmitted either through the Soviet Ambassador or First Secretary Zvonkov (sic) to the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or by the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the Czechoslovak Ambassador in Moscow, Karel Kreibich, or through the charge d'affaires, Dr. Jecny. They are transmitted to the Prague Ministry of Foreign Affairs according to degree of importance either by the Ambassador directly to the Minister, or by the Embassy counsellor to the Deputy Minister Emil Stefan or to the chief of the Soviet section, Dr. Ivan Kopecky. Politically important hints which do not have the character of diplomatic intervention are transmitted through Party channels. In some matters Soviet Ambassador M.A. Silin, deals directly with Gottwald. Such an atmosphere has been created in this sector that any suggestion or indication from the Soviet representatives is considered an order which must be carried out immediately. In a large number of matters, particularly those concerning international policy, precise, ready-made hints and directives come from Moscow, as in the delivery of diplomatic notes concerning Germany. Here the Soviet initiative is followed precisely, but the move is prepared in advance. The same process is observed in international dealings, at international conferences and in the United Nations. The fulfillment of all Soviet wishes, orders, and hints is guaranteed by the eagerness of Czechoslovak politicians and their mutual vigilance, as well as the fear of giving rise to any doubt concerning their devotion and obedience to the USSR. Control throughout this entire sector is exercised by the Central Secretariat of the Party, which cooperates directly with the Soviet authorities.
31. Soviet intervention in this sector affects personnel policy to a considerable degree even in regard to the filling of lower positions. For example, diplomatic protocol officials Kivana and Trubacek and a number of Czech Embassy employees, particularly in Germany, including Tink, Ambassador Otto Fischl and Antonin Snejdarek were replaced at Soviet instigation. Soviet desire to have an individual removed can be indicated by direct, open intervention or by Soviet refusal to deal with the person. Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Dr. Vavro Hajdu was afraid to the point of panic of the possibility of losing the confidence of the Soviets. A similar atmosphere

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has been created in the cultural life of Czechoslovakia. The one-sided orientation of culture is actually caused by the excessive zeal and devotion of Czechoslovak cultural leaders and by the Ministry of Information, Kopecky, Jiri Taufer, and Civrny: much more than by direct Soviet intervention. For fear of provoking doubt and suspicion against themselves, these cultural leaders reject practically everything that is not of Soviet creation or that has not already been definitely accepted and approved in the USSR. This criterion is also applied to their own domestic artistic and cultural creative activity.

32. This situation is most apparent in the press, where no report from abroad may be published unless it has been transmitted or confirmed by TASS even if it comes from a certified Czechoslovak correspondent abroad. This policy is carried so far that sometimes even Czechoslovak interests vis-a-vis the USSR are harmed. At a dinner given in New York by Governor Thomas Dewey in honor of the chiefs of all the delegations to the United Nations session in 1950, an incident occurred after which the Soviet delegation, headed by Vyshinsky, left the dinner. Of course, the delegations of Czechoslovakia and Poland followed. The special correspondent of CTK (the Czechoslovak Press Office) at that session immediately submitted a report of the incident. TASS, however, in its published report mentioned only the departure of the Soviet delegation. In Prague a dispute arose over the wording of the story for the press. The viewpoint of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was that the story should be published in the CTK version because it was unthinkable the Czech delegation should not have followed the Soviet example. This viewpoint, however, was suppressed by Geminder on the intervention of Taufer, and the TASS version of the story was published on the grounds that the USSR surely had a special reason for the wording of its report. This resulted in an unpleasantness for the Czech UN delegation, and Siroky personally objected to the non-publication of reports which he had approved. It was learned later that the TASS correspondent had merely forgotten to mention the departure of the two other delegations.
33. The development of intervention measures, or the opportunity for them, in the military field was substantially different from that of the other areas, since the army was not completely in the hands of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. The development of this intervention should be divided into three stages: prior to February 1948; February 1948 to April 1950; the contemporary situation. Before 1948, although it was publicly proclaimed that the Soviet army was the model for the Czechoslovak armed forces, it was not possible to put this slogan into practice because the leading positions in the army were occupied by persons who, although behaving in a loyal manner, were non-Communists and whose own orientation was different, in spite of their apparent collaboration. This group included Chief of Staff Bocek, his deputy Pika and most of the leading generals and officers from the west or from the prewar army. Liaison with the Soviet authorities at that time was handled exclusively through the armed forces department of the KSC, which was under Svab, or through the then Colonel Reicin, the so-called Soviet man in the army.
34. After February 1948 the situation substantially changed, but direct cooperation and intervention did not yet ensue, although collaboration was considerably expanded. Several commanders such as Drgac, who did not enjoy complete confidence, followed one another as chief of staff. Reicin conducted a purge

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in the army, but even then the composition of the officers' corps did not correspond to Soviet demands. The situation changed completely after the replacement of Svoboda as Minister of National Defense by Dr. Alexej Cepicka, a man for whom Gottwald personally gave full guarantee to the USSR. Cepicka immediately proceeded to make drastic changes in the army; he replaced a major part of the officers' corps and adapted the army completely to the Soviet system. Prochazka became chief of the general staff with the approval of the Soviets; the new deputy minister was Bohuslav Lastovicka, also a Gottwald man and formerly Czechoslovak ambassador in Moscow. These men are the main contacts for collaboration with the Soviet military mission in Czechoslovakia.

35. The activity of the Soviet military mission in Czechoslovakia is to a considerable extent coordinated with that of the Soviet commercial and economic mission. It is centralized in the official military mission at the Soviet Embassy in Prague, and Soviet military experts work directly in the Czech general staff and in the Ministry of National Defense. The military experts come here quite openly, and most of them wear their own Soviet uniforms, although some go about in civilian clothing. The actual center of the mission, however, is in Bubeneč, Na Tisíne. According to information not completely confirmed but considered trustworthy, the former insane asylum in Bohnice is to be made the permanent headquarters of the Soviet military mission and the Czechoslovak army personnel attached to it. This report is believed to be true for a number of reasons: the asylum is in a convenient location away from the center of the city and thus secluded, yet still in Prague; it is possible to approach it by three different routes; it is in a beautiful neighborhood; and it is a building hermetically sealed from the outside world. The entire area has been taken over by the Ministry of National Defense. The activity of the mission is divided into four main sectors: reorganization of the army according to the Soviet system; political education; military training; and war industry and armament. The responsible Soviet authority in the military sector is Marshal Konev who, with his staff, cooperates personally with Cepicka. His deputies, members of the permanent mission, are personal advisers to Cepicka in matters of reorganization of the army and armament. They also work at the Ministry of National Defense directly beside Cepicka.
36. The second most important person for the reorganization of the army and military training is Chief of Staff General Jaroslav Prochazka. In charge of political education is the commander of the military political administration, General Cenek Hruska, a member of the Red Army, who withdrew from the Czechoslovak Legions in Russia during the Russian Revolution. The main authority for questions of war industry and armament is General B. Lastovicka. All these persons work under the direct supervision of the Soviet mission, whose leaders do not appear publicly and who have no official functions or ranks in the Czech army. However, a number of Russian experts work in all lower positions at the side of Czech officers who officially have a leading role. In the latest purge, a number of Spanish volunteers were removed from leading positions; they were recently replaced by the party apparatus with Svoboda, Hromadko, Jekvasil, and others.
37. An obvious sign of the new orientation of the army was the recent introduction of designations and distinctions according to the Soviet pattern. There was a dispute in the army over this reform. Reicin opposed it holding the correct view that this measure, which publicly emphasizes subordination to the Soviet army, would provoke displeasure, would be harmful, and would complicate future work. He considered it a superfluous formality. The powerful pressure of Cepicka to strengthen the position of the army was further apparent in the new legal provisions to the advantage of the army which he pushed through. These provisions involved the right of the army to requisition dwellings for military officials and to requisition entire installations and schools for barracks, as well as the introduction of the new system of messing, which dealt a heavy blow to the entire economy. Moreover, the army has taken over athletic stadiums, theaters, and even some of the film studios, which are

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now at the exclusive disposal of a new institution, the so-called "Army Film", an educational component of the main political administration of the army. Here educational films are made under the supervision and assistance of Soviet technicians. Much attention is paid to the political content. The political administration is placing no less emphasis today on the military press; it is compulsory to read the military daily Obrana Lidu, the weekly Nase Vojsko, and literature of the army press, which supplement political education. Army theater groups make trips to military training camps and garrisons.

38. The armed forces are completely isolated from normal life by conditions newly introduced in the army, under which soldiers' freedom is restricted, and during free time departure from the barracks is very difficult. The soldiers' leaves are similarly restricted and granted only to so-called model soldiers. The purpose is to control the viewpoint of the soldier and to create an atmosphere in which he will be more susceptible to the spirit and effectiveness of the newly introduced political education. Fighting discipline is being instilled according to the Soviet pattern; the soldier is told that he must fight to the last ditch and then fall but never surrender.
39. The training camps, located mostly in the border regions, especially in the Cesky les (Bohemian Forest) and Sumava areas, represent a new form of military training from the Soviet pattern. The training is exceedingly hard, long, and exhausting. Discipline is ruthlessly strict; in the camps there is a general atmosphere of combat conditions. On the other hand, the camps are fully and expensively equipped with club-houses, motion picture theaters, libraries, baths, and so forth. The fare is very substantial. New equipment is gradually being installed for the whole army. In the training camps there is special training by Soviet experts, members of the mission. The maneuvers serve at the same time as a test of new combat methods. Great emphasis is placed on partisan combat, and special training is given by Soviet specialists. In combat training, on the Soviet pattern, losses of both men and materiel are permitted. This type of training was strictly forbidden until 1950.
40. One of the chief groups of Soviet specialists is the part of the mission charged with cooperation with, or rather, administration of, war production and armament. In this sector the Ministry of National Defense is in direct contact with the Planning Office and the appropriate departments of industry, and they have the right to check the special sections in the plants, which with rare exceptions are exclusively for munitions. Lastovicka, with his own Soviet advisers, is in charge. The Soviet military experts work in these special sections either as a part of the Soviet technical missions or independently with representatives of the Czech army in cases where the army is directly and officially represented and itself checks and directs the production sector concerned.
41. The Soviet military mission in Czechoslovakia maintains formal official relations with the Ministry of National Defense and the other Czechoslovak authorities through so-called army protocol, of which Major Dorsky is in charge. Besides this, it has Czech liaison officers at its disposal. Relations with the office of the President of the Republic are maintained through the President's personal military adviser, General Satorie. Satorie has direct contact with Cepicka, and works with his personal advisers and the mission leaders. Slansky is personally responsible in the Communist Party for army matters, and he has assumed the function of chairman of the Parliamentary Arms Committee.**

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42. The Soviet military mission has entered into the whole reorganization of the Ministry of National Defense and the Czechoslovak army. Due to the influence of very high Soviet officials there were changes in high Czechoslovak positions, including the removal of General Svoboda. The mission was persuaded of the necessity of removing Reicin directly by Gottwald (sic). Its influence in the army today is almost unlimited, as it has the multiple power of checking, direct contact, and the potential power of intervention in the case of persons who do not convince it of their reliability or tractability. Moreover, the top posts in the army today are held and will continue to be held by persons who guarantee cooperation without reservation and who agree to check on each other.
43. A special section of the army, which is completely under Soviet direction, is the special military school for field officers, where military science and tactics are studied directly from Soviet sources and where Soviet experts personally give lectures. Students for this school are chosen through an especially complicated personnel procedure, and are almost completely separated from the outside world. One course of this school is conducted in the USSR. These officers are being trained as commanders of certain combat units in the event of war or as liaison officers with Soviet headquarters. Soviet training today is introduced even into the lower levels of military training by officers who are military experts and by political commissars, experts, on political work and education in the army who are given military ranks.

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- * [REDACTED] Comment: Smolka and Kroupa had laid the groundwork in the case against William Oatis and were responsible for his residence visa being renewed. After Smolka's arrest in February 1951 and Kroupa's transfer to regular SNB police duty, the Oatis case was handled by Pixa and Sulc.

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- ** [REDACTED] Comment: The personalities concerned have been changed since the governmental shake-up of 7 September. This was dealt with by Source in [REDACTED]*.

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- *** [REDACTED] Comment: There is a Pavel Aleksandrovich Yudin, who is known to have been Minister of the Building Materials Industry as late as 1950. It is believed that these men are not the same.

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